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of
WILLIAM L. CARY
Whereas, in 1977, the Public Oversight Board was appointed to monitor and evaluate the activities of an 
enhanced program of self-regulation of the accounting profession through the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, and
Whereas, for more than four years, your talent, vision and fine judgment have benefitted the accounting 
profession, the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and most par­
ticularly, the Public Oversight Board, and
Whereas, you played an instrumental role in formulating the Board’s jurisdiction and operating policies 
and in formulating the Board’s thoughts relative to the accounting profession’s self-regulating program, and
Whereas, your sound reasoning, judgment and legal scholarship, as well as your wide experience, includ­
ing that of former chairmanship of the Securities and Exchange Commission, were relied upon heavily by the 
Board in its decision-making process, and
Whereas, your ideas were invariably imaginative and provocative and it is with sincere regret that the 
Board accepts your decision to resign. Now, therefore, be it
Resolved: That the members of the Public Oversight Board individually and collectively express to you 
their deep appreciation for the efforts you expended in behalf of the Board’s progress. Your service has earned 
you the admiration and affection of all your fellow Board members. Your contribution to the profession and to 
the Board will have continuing effect
October 19, 1982
John J. McCloy
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June 3 0 ,  1983
To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section, 
Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Other Interested Parties
It is my pleasure to transmit this fifth annual report of the Public Oversight Board. The fifth 
anniversary of the commencement of the accounting profession’s self-regulatory program 
seems an appropriate time to present the Board’s assessment of the program’s accom­
plishments to date and identify some challenges that may lie ahead. Accordingly, this report 
summarizes not only the activities of the SEC Practice Section for the year ended June 30, 
1983, but also the major events of the first five years of the program.
The past five years have constituted a learning experience for all who have been actively 
involved in the program. Among other things, we have gained an increased awareness of the 
sharp differences between governmental regulation and self-regulation. The accompanying 
report seeks to identify these differences and to comment on the proper objectives for the 
section’s self-regulatory program.
The Board believes that the accounting profession deserves credit for the effective program 
which it now has in place. It will, of course, require constant refinement and attention to 
maintain and improve its quality and effectiveness.
Very truly yours,
John J. McCloy 
Chairman
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ANNUAL REPORT 
1982-1983
The SEC Practice Section and the Private Companies Practice Section constitute the 
Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The divi­
sion was created in the fall of 1977 in response to a perceived need for a more effective self- 
regulatory program for the accounting profession. The Public Oversight Board was formed in 
1978 to oversee the activities of the SEC Practice Section.
At the invitation of the Council of the Institute, John J. McCloy, Chairman of the 
Board, reported informally at the Council meeting on May 9 ,  1983 in Phoenix, Arizona, on the 
first five years of progress of the SEC section. The text of his address is set forth in Exhibit I.
This fifth annual report of the Public Oversight Board describes the activities of the 
SEC section during the period July 1 ,  1982 to June 3 0 , 1983 and supplements Mr. McCloy’s 
report by summarizing the section’s accomplishments during its first five years.
OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM
The Role of the Board
The past five years have been a learning experience for all who have been actively 
involved in the operation of the self-regulatory program—an interesting, exciting and, at times, 
difficult but nevertheless productive experience. Three persons have served as Board members 
throughout this period—John J. McCloy as chairman, and Arthur M. Wood and John D. Har­
per as members. Mr. Wood currently serves as vice-chairman. The Board benefitted greatly 
from the contributions of two former SEC chairmen—Ray Garrett, Jr. and William L. Cary— 
who were charter members of the Board. Mr. Garrett died in 1980 while a member and Mr. Cary 
died in 1982 shortly after resigning because of illness. Robert K. Mautz, the first accountant to 
be appointed a member, joined the Board in 1981, and A. A. Sommer, Jr., a former SEC com­
missioner, was appointed in 1983. The current composition of the Board and its staff are shown 
in Exhibit II. Estimated expenses of the Board for the year ended July 31, 1983 are shown in 
Exhibit III.
The Board’s primary function is to monitor and comment on the section’s activities. 
From the beginning, the Board has taken the position that if the self-regulatory program is to be 
successful, all authority must be vested in the profession itself. The Board does not have line 
authority and desires none.
The Board discharges its responsibilities by meeting regularly with officials and com­
mittees responsible for the various components of the program, observing and reviewing the 
results of the peer review and special investigative processes, and periodically conferring with 
the commissioners and staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC, charged by 
Congress with overseeing the practice of accountants before the commission, interacts with the 
accounting profession’s self-regulatory program. The profession’s self-regulatory program
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supplements and complements the SEC’s oversight program and must be viewed in concert with 
the other regulatory mechanisms in our society. The first five years of the program provided 
numerous opportunities for the section and the SEC to work together to coordinate their efforts 
and make their respective programs more efficient. As a result of the experience gained, both the 
section and the SEC have a clearer understanding today of what the program can reasonably be 
expected to accomplish.
The SEC has actively monitored and encouraged the self-regulatory program of the 
accounting profession. As indicated in its 1982 report to Congress (SEC Report), the SEC is 
placing increased reliance on the profession’s program.1 An excerpt of its 1982 report is set forth 
in Exhibit IV.
Differences Between Self-Regulation and Government Regulation
Perhaps the most valuable experience gained during the initial period has been a 
recognition that self-regulation is not a substitute for governmental regulation. The methods and 
objectives of a self-regulatory program are markedly different from those of a governmental 
regulatory agency. Recently, these differences were articulated by Board member Robert K. 
Mautz, whose article on the subject appeared in the Journal o f  Accountancy for May 1983 and 
is reproduced as Exhibit V.
Many persons, including some members of the profession and some governmental 
officials, equate self-regulation with governmental regulation or perceive self-regulation as a 
substitute for governmental regulation. Dr. Mautz points out that there is a general misun­
derstanding of what self-regulation entails and that such misunderstanding may be a significant 
impediment to the program in achieving the credibility it deserves. The effectiveness of a self- 
regulatory program should be measured by the merit of its objectives and the extent to which it 
achieves them, not by the extent to which it emulates governmental regulation. Governmental 
regulation emphasizes the deterrent effects of punishment and sanctions in dealing with inade­
quate performance. The accounting profession’s self-regulatory program, particularly through 
the preventative measures of its peer review and special investigative processes, emphasizes 
corrective action to minimize the recurrence of inadequate performance and uses sanctions only 
to compel the undertaking of corrective action deemed necessary to protect the public interest 
Some critics of self-regulation question its effectiveness and are likely to continue to do so as 
long as they expect it to emulate the governmental regulatory model. The profession should dis­
abuse these critics of their unrealistic expectations.
M ajor Committees of the Section
The important work of the section is administered through its three major committees, 
the executive committee, peer review committee, and special investigations committee, whose 
membership is set forth in Exhibit VI.
1 Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report, 1982, U.S. Government Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
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PEER REVIEW PROCESS
History of Peer Reviews
The peer review process is the foundation of the section’s self-regulatory program. 
Through this process, the section determines whether member firms have, and are complying 
with, an appropriate quality control system in the performance of accounting and auditing 
engagements in a manner that gives reasonable assurance that professional standards are being 
m et By subjecting their accounting and auditing practices to peer review, member firms 
demonstrate their dedication to achieving and maintaining high quality professional practices.
In the relatively short period of five years since its inception, the section has developed 
an impressive peer review process and over four hundred SEC section firms have undergone one 
or two peer reviews.
The Board and its staff closely monitor the peer review process and believe that its 
emphasis on improving the quality control systems of members has produced results that are in 
the public’s and the profession’s best interests. Every peer review includes an examination of a 
reasonable cross-section of the reviewed firm’s accounting and auditing engagements and, in 
multioffice firms, a representative number of practice offices. Peer review has assisted member 
firms in improving the quality of their accounting and auditing practices, thereby reducing the 
possibility of future audit failure. It must be noted, however, that peer reviewers examine only a 
sample of the firm’s engagements and thus an unqualified peer review report is not to be con­
strued as a guarantee that the firm has performed all engagements, and will perform all future 
engagements, in accordance with professional standards.
The SEC recognizes the positive impact that the peer review process has on the quality 
of audit practice. The SEC Report2 comments on the efficacy of peer review as follows: “ If and 
when audit failures occur, the commission expects they will be due to isolated breakdowns or 
‘people problems,’ and not to inherent deficiencies in firms’ systems of quality control.”
Improvements in Quality of Practice by Member Firms
Most firms are determined by peer reviewers to have effective systems of quality con­
trol. However, many reviewers identify areas where improvements are suggested and, in some 
cases, required. In those circumstances, in addition to the report on the peer review, the reviewer 
issues a letter of comments identifying areas that could be strengthened. The peer review com­
mittee reviews all reports, letters of comments, and the related corrective action plans filed by 
reviewed firms, and it evaluates each firm’s corrective action plan to eliminate weaknesses in its 
controls or to assure greater compliance with its policies and procedures. The committee 
requires candor in reporting and aggressively pursues engagements deemed not to have been 
performed in accordance with professional standards. After the committee concludes that the 
review was performed and reported on in accordance with the section’s standards and that 
appropriate actions are being taken by the firm, it places all these documents in a file available to 
the public on request. A summary of the types of reports issued during the first five years of the 
program is shown in Table 1.
2 Securities and Exchange Commission, op. c it.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF TYPES OF PEER REVIEW REPORTS 
ISSUED DURING FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE PROGRAM
Review Year
Total 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978
Firms receiving unqualified report 
without letter of comments 34 5 16 9 2 2
Firms receiving unqualified report 
and letter of comments 360 63 152 109 28 8
Firms receiving modified report* 63 3 27 24 8 1
Firms receiving adverse report* 13 — 8 3 2 —
470 71 203 145 40 11
• Thirty-five reports were adverse or modified for more than one reason. The reasons cited were:
Inadequate documentation or noncompliance in a desig­
nated area of quality control:
Supervision 
Inspection 
Consultation 
Independence 
Advancement 
Assignment of Personnel
43
41
4
4
4
1
97
Noncompliance with other membership requirements:
Concurring partner review 14
Continuing professional education 9
Liability insurance 6
Other __ 2
31
Additional Requirements Imposed by Committee
The committee has the authority to recommend that the executive committee impose a 
sanction if a firm’s quality control system cannot be relied on and the firm refuses to make the 
corrections deemed necessary. Although the committee has not as yet exercised this authority, it 
has required some firms to comply with rather severe additional requirements when their quality 
control systems were deemed to be materially deficient. Since these requirements were volun­
tarily agreed to by the firms, they have not been classified as sanctions, even though they 
achieved the same objective.
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To date, the committee has required thirty firms to permit a revisit by the peer reviewer 
or an alternate to determine whether the firm had taken appropriate corrective action. Twenty- 
two firms agreed, as a condition of continued membership, to undergo an accelerated full scope 
peer review, i.e., a review in the next year or two rather than in the third year. To date, ten of the 
firms that previously received highly modified or adverse reports have had their revised quality 
control systems subjected to peer review. These subsequent reviews ascertained that each of 
these firms improved its practice substantially, eight to such an extent that they received 
unqualified reports. Twelve firms were allowed sufficient time to implement corrective action 
and accordingly their reviews are scheduled for the latter half of 1983. Two firms withdrew 
rather than undergo an accelerated review. In all these situations, correspondence between the 
committee and reviewed firms detailing these additional requirements is placed in the public file. 
Table 2 provides additional information.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS 
TO ASSURE QUALITY CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS 
IN CONNECTION WITH PEER REVIEWS 
DURING THE FIVE YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 1983
Type of Report/Action 
of the Committee
Review Year
Total 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978
Firms receiving adverse report 
Accelerated peer review 
Revisit by peer reviewer
12
1
Firms receiving modified report 
Accelerated peer review 
Revisit by peer reviewer
13
9
Firms receiving unqualified report 
and letter of comments 
Revisit by peer reviewer
Total reviews where corrective 
actions were required as a condi­
tion of continued membership 41 22 13
The SEC Report commented on the committee’s practice of imposing additional 
requirements as follows:
“ The commission concurs in the POB’s belief that this 
informal process gives the SECPS the ability to act promptly 
and achieves the same result as the imposition of a sanction.
The formal sanction process remains available and should be 
used when mandatory corrective measures are not under­
taken promptly or where a member chooses not to cooperate.”
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Substandard Performance on Individual Engagements
While the thrust of peer review is to identify and correct defi ciencies in a firm’s system 
of quality control, the process also deals with instances of substandard auditing or accounting 
performance on individual engagements, which are required to be reported promptly to the com­
mittee. During 1981 and 1982, peer reviewers reviewed the financial statements, reports, and 
workpapers for more than nineteen hundred audit engagements. Sixty-one of these engage­
ments were deemed to be substandard in the application of generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples (GAAP) or generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). In approximately thirty-six 
percent of the cases in which the financial statements were not in accordance with GAAP, the 
reviewed firm immediately recalled its report, and the financial statements were reissued. The 
remaining cases generally involved reports given limited distribution and did not require 
immediate recall; however, the firms agreed to cause the deficiencies to be corrected in the sub­
sequent year’s report
In each instance where the peer reviewers concluded that the audit had not been per­
formed in accordance with GAAS, the firm either immediately performed the omitted pro­
cedures or agreed to perform the procedures in a subsequent imminent audit Table 3 summarizes 
the actions taken by the firms in connection with engagements found not to have been performed 
in accordance with professional standards.
T A B L E  3
SUBSTANDARD AUDIT ENGAGEMENTS 
IN PEER REVIEWS PERFORMED IN 1982 AND 1981
Corrective Action Required by Committee Total 1982 1981
Audit report recalled and financial statements revised 
and reissued 14 4 10
Omitted auditing procedures performed 7 4 3
Cause of impairment of independence eliminated 3 - 3
GAAP and GAAS deficiencies not requiring im­
mediate action to be corrected in subsequent year’s 
audit 37 6 31
Number of audit engagements considered sub­
standard by peer reviewer 61 14 47
Number of audit engagements reviewed 1,919 584 1,335
Percent 3.2% 2.4% 3.5%
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Modification of Peer Review Standards and Procedures
The peer review process is being modified as experience is gained. The committee 
recently revised its manual and updated its codification of standards for performing and 
reporting on peer reviews. This codification incorporates many of the suggestions made by the 
POB staff and the SEC staff. For example, beginning with 1983 reviews, reviewers are given 
more specific guidance in selecting for review a representative sample of audit work performed 
by other offices under the supervision of the office primarily responsible for the overall engage­
ment. If a firm has multioffice engagements, the reviewer must now review for at least one such 
engagement the workpapers prepared by the primary office and at least one other office perform­
ing a significant segment of that engagement
New procedures were adopted to further expedite completion of peer reviews. As pre­
viously reported, during the initial years of the peer review process, many reviews were com­
pleted much later than planned. Each member firm is now required to submit to the peer review 
committee its peer review report, letter of comments and response no later than thirty days after 
issuance of the report and letter of comments. Failure to do so could lead to the imposition of a 
sanction. In addition, a reviewer failing to complete and report on a review in a timely, pro­
fessional manner could be subject to disciplinary action. Review procedures also require 
reviewers to consult immediately with the committee when instances of materially substandard 
performance are identified, thereby expediting committee involvement and facilitating timely 
resolution of such matters. Vigorous enforcement of these procedures will improve the pace of 
processing reports and the timeliness of corrective action.
Experience has permitted other efficiencies in the process to be adopted. For example, 
standards now permit a reviewer, who after appropriate testing concludes that he can rely on the 
reviewed firm’s inspection program, to use inspection findings along with peer review findings as 
a basis for his report By so doing, the reviewer reduces the number of offices and the number of 
engagements he personally reviews, thus substantially reducing the cost of peer review.
Elimination of the Quality Control Review Panel
A peer review can be conducted by a team appointed by the section’s peer review com­
mittee, by a team or firm appointed by an association whose plan for administering reviews has 
been approved by the peer review committee, or by another member firm selected by the firm to 
be reviewed.
Prior to 1982, at the insistence of the SEC, a panel was assigned to each peer review 
conducted by another firm or administered by an association of CPA firms. The panel’s respon­
sibility was to issue an independent opinion on the quality control system of the reviewed firm. 
The procedures and the report of the panel, in essence,duplicated those of the primary reviewer. 
Based on a study conducted by the Board’s staff to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the panel, 
the Board recommended that the panel be eliminated. The section accepted and implemented 
the Board’s recommendation and the SEC did not object.
The Board is confident that elimination of the panel has not impaired the effectiveness 
of the process. As a transitional procedure, members of the committee performed preissuance 
reviews on a sample of 1982 firm-on-firm and association reviews. Evaluation of the results of 
the transitional procedure indicated that preissuance review procedures were unnecessary.
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primarily because they were duplicative of oversight procedures conducted by the Board’s staff. 
Consequently, beginning with 1983 reviews, the committee performs preissuance review pro­
cedures only on a case-by-case basis upon recommendations of its chairman or staff. The Board 
concurs with this decision.
Oversight of the Process
Because of the importance of peer review in the overall self-regulatory program, the 
Board and its staff devote a significant amount of time to monitoring all aspects of the process. 
The staff attends all meetings of the committee and, at its discretion, attends most meetings of 
the committee’s subcommittees and task forces. The Board’s views are generally sought on all 
proposed changes in the peer review process and its comments on individual peer reviews are 
considered by the committee in deciding whether the review was performed in accordance with 
prescribed standards.
As in each of the preceding years, during 1982-83 the Board continued its policy of mon­
itoring all reviews. It observed reviews in process on all firms with five or more SEC clients and, 
on a random sample basis, a number of other firms with fewer than five SEC clients and a rep­
resentative number of firms with no SEC clients. Details are shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4
SCOPE OF BOARD OVERSIGHT 
OF 1982 PEER REVIEWS
Visitation and workpaper review 
Workpaper review 
Report review 
Total
Number of Firms by 
Number of SEC Clients
30 or 
more
5 to 
29
1 to 
4 None Total
4 3 14 9 30
- - 8 24 32
12 12
4 3 22 45 74
The SEC independently evaluates the peer review process including the effectiveness 
of Board oversight. The SEC conducts an independent inspection of a sample of peer reviewer 
workpapers and Board oversight workpapers under an arrangement agreed to by the section. All 
workpapers are masked so as not to reveal the identity of individual clients. Under a 1982 mod­
ification of that arrangement, workpapers relating to firms with fewer than ten SEC clients are 
masked to conceal the identity of the reviewed firm in order to reduce further the possibility of 
client identification.
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The SEC continues to have a high level of interest in the program and has actively sup­
ported it by both constructive suggestions and public endorsement. Based on its inspection of 
1982 peer review workpapers, as described above, the SEC has again expressed satisfaction 
with the peer review process and the effectiveness of the Board’s oversight procedures. The SEC 
Report states that “ the Commission has determined that it can rely to a great extent on the 
f o b ’s oversight function in fulfilling its own oversight responsibilities.”3
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
Member firms are required to report to the special investigations committee each litiga­
tion and proceeding (case) against them or members of their firms involving allegations of failure 
in the conduct of an audit of the financial statements of an SEC registrant The committee deter­
mines whether such allegations indicate a need for improvements in the quality control systems 
of such firms or whether changes in professional standards are required.
Objectives of the Process
Investigation of a firm’s quality control system supplements the peer review process as 
a means of protecting users of financial statements. Unlike governmental regulation, which 
focuses on an alleged audit failure as a matter deserving possible punitive action, the commit­
tee’s investigative process focuses on reducing the possibility of future failures. It does so by (1) 
identifying deficiencies in the auditing firm’s quality control system that may have permitted the 
alleged deficiency to occur and (2) causing such deficiencies to be corrected. The special inves­
tigative process protects the public by reducing the likelihood of a recurrence through remedy 
and improvement
Operation of the Committee
One or two committee members are assigned to each reported case, and each case is 
subjected to one or more of four levels of examination: screening, monitoring, investigating cer­
tain aspects of the firm’s quality control system, and investigating the specific alleged audit 
failure.
During screening, the committee considers whether the charges regarding possible 
audit failure appear to have substance. In some cases, a mere reading of the complaint and the 
financial statements to which it relates permit the committee to conclude that allegations are 
without merit. In other cases, the preliminary review needs to be supplemented by a discussion 
of the allegations with representatives of the auditing firm and a review of the findings of the 
firm’s most recent peer review.
If the results of the screening process warrant, the committee monitors the case in order 
to follow and evaluate future developments. For example, a case may be monitored pending the 
results of a peer review in process, issuance of a bankruptcy trustee’s report or further discussion 
with firm representatives.
3Securities and Exchange Commission, op. c it .
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If the committee concludes that a failure in the firm’s quality control system may have 
occurred and there is a reasonable possibility for a recurrence, it conducts an investigation of the 
relevant aspects of the firm’s quality control system. If the findings of the investigation warrant, 
it requires the firm to amend its quality control policies and procedures accordingly.
Status of Reported Cases
Since the inception of the special investigative process in November 1979, sixty-six 
cases of alleged audit failure involving SEC registrants have been reported. In addition, the com­
mittee obtained the consent of the firms involved to add to its agenda two cases involving non- 
SEC registrants.
The committee has closed its files on forty-three cases. Of these, twenty-eight were 
closed after being screened, twelve after being monitored, and three after an investigation of the 
firm had been conducted. Of the remaining cases, thirteen are being screened, ten are being mon­
itored, and two cases involving the same firm are being investigated. A summary of committee 
activity is shown in Table 5.
T A B L E  5
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE ACTIVITY 
FOR THE PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 1 ,  1979 (INCEPTION) 
THROUGH JUNE 3 0 ,  1983
Investigation
Cases reported by member firms 
Action taken:
Determined that developments should be 
monitored
Authorized an investigation 
Closed the case
Status of cases at June 3 0 , 1983
Screening Monitoring of Firm
68
(25) 25
(2) (3) 5*
(28) (12) (3)
13 10 2
* Two cases involve one firm.
Investigations of Firms
To date, the committee has conducted investigations of selected aspects of the quality 
control systems of four member firms. The committee dictated the scope of and supervised the 
conduct of each of the investigations that were performed either by the investigated firm’s pre­
vious peer reviewer or by a special task force. These investigative teams generally examined 
other engagements supervised by personnel involved in the alleged failure and engagements in
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similar industries and with similar accounting and auditing issues to those involved in the reported 
litigation. Findings of the investigations were reviewed by one or more committee members 
assigned to the investigation and discussed by the full committee. Three of the four inves­
tigations resulted in recommendations for improvement in the firm’s quality control system or 
compliance therewith, all of which were voluntarily implemented by each of the firms. The files 
on three of the investigations have been closed, but the committee is keeping its file open on the 
fourth investigation pending the receipt of the findings of an ongoing review to determine 
whether the suggested improvements have in fact been implemented. None of the four inves­
tigations resulted in discovery of a deficiency in the firm’s quality control system so major that 
the imposition of a sanction was warranted
Investigations of Alleged Audit Failures
Although the committee’s charter document provides that it may, with prior executive 
committee approval, investigate a specific alleged audit failure prior to completion of litigation, 
the conduct of such an investigation has not yet occurred and it is expected that such an inves­
tigation rarely will be necessary. The Board believes that the committee’s authority to inves­
tigate a specific alleged audit failure should continue. However, this action should be reserved 
for limited situations such as ascertaining whether there is a deficiency in a firm’s quality control 
system or in generally accepted auditing standards that cannot be ascertained by other 
means.
Certain practical limitations affect the committee’s ability to conduct an investigation 
of a specific alleged failure. In fact, the capacity of the committee to conduct an investigation is 
far more limited than that of private litigants or the SEC. For example, it cannot take testimony 
of witnesses under oath and it cannot subpoena documents or witnesses. It must rely on the 
willingness of the audit firm to supply evidence. Hence, were it to pass judgment on a firm or an 
individual in connection with an alleged audit failure, it would not have as firm a basis for that 
judgment as would the SEC or a court. The danger of an unfair result would be significant. Com­
pounding the problem is the fact that private litigants might then use this conclusion, founded on 
an insufficient record, as evidence in civil litigation.
Since the primary objective of the special investigative process is preventive and not 
punitive, the committee can accomplish its objective effectively by conducting an investigation 
of the firm’s quality control system without the risks inherent in an investigation of the specific 
alleged audit failure.
The Board believes that the special investigative process has no need to duplicate the 
work of the SEC or the civil courts. Rather, the committee’s responsibility is (1) to determine 
whether charges in litigation or other proceedings involving audit performance indicate that 
there are insufficiencies in auditing standards or the quality controls of the auditing firm that 
require remedial action and (2) to ascertain that such remedial action is taken so that whatever 
gave rise to the charges should not again be the source of problems.
Procedures
During its entire three-year existence, the committee has continuously improved its 
operational procedures. In a typical case, committee members read the complaint and other
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publicly available materials. In addition, committee members routinely interview firm represen­
tatives with respect to the allegations, quality controls in areas of the alleged audit failure, the 
present responsibilities of the personnel involved in the litigation and the date of the last peer 
review or internal inspection of the office and partner involved in the litigation. The committee 
members may also interview the firm’s most recent peer reviewer and examine peer review 
workpapers and reports to gain a better understanding of the firm’s quality control policies and 
procedures and general compliance therewith.
The committee, with the cooperation of the firms involved, has actively pursued the 
quality control implications of each reported alleged audit failure. In this connection, during the 
past year the committee members (1) met with firm representatives on twenty-one cases to dis­
cuss the allegations and the firm’s relevant quality control policies and procedures, (2) read peer 
review reports and selected workpapers on all firms involved in litigation, made an extensive 
review of workpapers on five occasions, and met with the firm’s peer reviewer on three occasions, 
(3) obtained advice on accounting and auditing issues from authoritative sources within the 
Institute, and (4) reviewed reports of investigations concerning reported cases conducted by 
public bodies.
Before the committee authorizes an investigation of a firm or recommends an investiga­
tion of a specific alleged audit failure, the firm’s representatives are invited to appear before the 
committee to present their views on the matter and respond to committee questions.
The committee uses internal guidelines to provide a consistent basis for reviewing and 
deciding upon action to be taken with regard to reported litigation. These guidelines are not rules 
that are rigidly followed, but they assist the committee in its decision-making process and reflect 
the practices that have evolved during the committee’s three-year existence.
Confidentiality of Committee Actions
The Board and its staff believe the committee’s actions to date constitute an aggressive 
self-regulation effort of which, unfortunately, the public is largely unaware. However, rules 
require that the committee conduct its affairs in privacy, beyond the glare of publicity and 
without public disclosure, except in extreme and unusual cases. This requirement of privacy is 
not to shield members of the profession or deny the public information it is entitled to have. The 
section considers privacy essential to allow the committee to operate effectively and to avoid 
prejudicing a member firm while litigation is in process. The Board is not insensitive to sugges­
tions that means be found to ease the restraints of privacy now surrounding the committee’s 
activities. The Board, however, opposes any such action that would unfairly prejudice the rights 
of any firm or deny any firm the opportunity to answer charges in the forum provided by law, 
which permits them as well as their adversaries full access to the evidence necessary to assure 
that justice is done.
Board Oversight of 1982-83 Activities
Since the Board’s last report, the committee has held nine meetings, and committee 
members assigned to specific cases under investigation have each held several meetings with 
personnel of the firms involved. Members of the Board and its staff attended most of these 
meetings.
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The Board has complete access to all committee files and actively monitors the commit­
tee’s decisions on individual cases. The Board’s staff reads the pertinent court documents, finan­
cial information, and correspondence related to reported cases, and it attends, at its discretion, 
meetings between firm representatives and committee members. In addition, the staff reviews 
the committee’s workpapers on all investigations.
The Board concurs with the direction and thrust of the special investigative process and 
believes the process is functioning effectively.
Board Liaison with the SEC
The Board and its staff meet periodically with the chairman and staff members of the 
SEC to discuss the various aspects of the self-regulatory program. In these meetings, operating 
under the privacy requirement imposed on the special investigative process, the section and the 
Board have attempted to provide sufficient information to the SEC so as to permit it to have con­
fidence in the effectiveness of the process and the Board’s oversight thereof. However, the SEC 
believes that it needs additional information to reach an independent conclusion regarding the 
special investigative process. Exploratory discussions between the section, the SEC, and the 
Board are continuing; in the long run, the Board hopes to persuade the SEC to rely to a large 
degree upon the Board’s oversight of the special investigative process.
SECTION MEMBERSHIP
Almost 1,700 firms belong to the division for CPA firms; 426 belong to both the private 
companies and SEC sections and 1,259 belong only to the private companies section. Member 
firms represent approximately 3,800 practice units, 16,500 partners, and 100,000 professional 
staff members. While the number of member firms decreased during the past year, the number of 
SEC clients audited by member firms and the number of professionals employed by member 
firms both increased during the past year. Details are shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF MEMBERSHIP 
IN THE DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS 
JUNE 30, 1982 AND JUNE 30, 1983
Both Sections SEC Section
Classification 1982 1983
Increase
(Decrease) 1982 1983
Increase
(Decrease)
Number of firms 1,882 1,685 (197) 428 426 (2)
Number of SEC clients 9,865 10,330 465 9,618 10,147 529
Number of practice units 3,986 3,771 (215) 1,941 1,957 16
Number of professionals 99,398 100,024 626 79,548 83,925 4,377
1 3 -
A uditors o f Publicly-traded Com panies
Firms that are members of the division continue to have a significant impact on the 
quality of audits of publicly-traded companies. Three hundred eleven member firms audit 87 
percent of all public companies listed in the ninth edition of Who Audits America.4 As shown in 
Table 7, these companies account for over 98 percent of the combined sales volume of all 
publicly-traded companies.
TABLE 7 
ANALYSIS OF
FIRMS THAT AUDIT PUBLICLY-TRADED COMPANIES* 
LISTED IN THE NINTH EDITION OF WHO AUDITS AMERICA
Annual Sales**
SEC Registrants
Number Percent Dollar Percent
Companies audited by members of 
the division for CPA Firms
By the eight largest firms 5,959 70.0% $3,568,045 96.1%
By other firms 1,265 14.9 92,316 2.5
By firms that are members only 
o f  PCPS 148 1.7 2,135 .1
Total 7,372 86.6% $3,662,496 98.7%
Companies audited by foreign 
firms 64 .7 34,957 .9
Companies whose auditors are 
not identified 154 1.8 4,917 .1
Companies audited by U.S. firms 
not members of the division 924 10.9 11,710 .3
8,514 100% $3,714,080 100%
* Does not include the following types of companies filing with the SEC: limited partnerships, employee 
stock option plans, smaller companies in various stages of bankruptcy, etc.
** Annual sales of less than $1 million are not reported in Who Audits America. Sales of each such com­
pany are estimated at $500 thousand in the above analysis.
4 Who Audits America, 9th ed. (Menlo Park, Calif.: Data Financial Press, 1982.)
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Members of the division audit all but three of the U.S. companies whose stocks are lis­
ted on the New York Stock Exchange and all but twenty-four of the U.S. companies listed on the 
American Stock Exchange.
Membership Promotion
While the statistics cited above are impressive, a broader base of membership is needed 
to provide the public with the full benefits of the self-regulatory program. Division membership 
now stands at 1,685 firms, down from a high of 2,200 firms in 1980. SEC section membership is 
426 firms, down from a high of 579 firms in 1979. While membership in the SEC section 
remained relatively constant during the twelve months ended June 3 0 , 1983, membership in the 
private companies section decreased by 195. Table 8 presents an analysis of membership as of 
June 30, 1983, and changes in membership for the year then ended. It should be noted that 
mergers among member firms account for a decrease of thirty-nine member firms.
T A B L E  8
ANALYSIS OF MEMBERSHIP 
IN THE DIVISION FOP CPA FIRMS 
BY NUMBER OF SEC CLIENTS AND BY SECTION 
JUNE 30, 1982 TO JUNE 30, 1983
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Number of Firms by Number of 
SEC Clients
Five or more SEC clients
Both sections or SECPS only 45 — — (1) — (1) 43
PCPS only 1 — — — — 2 3
One to four SEC clients
Both sections or SECPS only 160 12 (13) (6) — 1 154
PCPS only 115 25 (22) (1) (2) 1 116
No SEC clients
Both sections or SECPS only 223 41 (28) (6) (1) — 229
PCPS only 1,338 153 (278) (25) (45) (3) 1,140
Totals
Both sections or SECPS only 428 53 (41) (13) (1) — 426
PCPS only 1,454 178 (300) (26) (47) — 1,259
Grand Totals 1,882 231 (341) (39) (48) — 1,685
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While the self-regulatory objectives of both sections are similar, the SEC section has an 
additional goal, i.e., to improve the quality of practice before the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission. Consistent with that goal, the section has established certain additional member­
ship requirements.
One hundred nineteen firms that audit SEC clients are members of the private com­
panies section only; these firms audit 183 SEC registrants. The Board believes that every firm 
that audits one or more SEC clients should join the SEC section and the SEC in its 1982 report 
expressed the same view.
Impediments to Increasing Membership
The Board believes it is important that the division identify and eliminate to the greatest 
extent possible the causes for attrition and the impediments to attracting new members. In 1982, 
the division engaged a research firm to determine the attitudes of members and nonmembers 
about the division and the factors that might motivate members to join either or both sections. 
That study revealed that the overwhelming majority of members and nonmembers support the 
division, seeing it as " a forward step for the profession and an opportunity to minimize govern­
ment interference and regulation.” 5
While the survey indicated satisfaction with the improvement in the quality of practice 
of member firms resulting from the peer review process, it revealed several perceived impedi­
ments to membership. The reasons most frequently cited by nonmember firms were that the cost 
of peer review is not offset by commensurate benefits and services and that the accomplishments 
of the division are virtually unknown outside the profession.
Cost o f Peer Review
The cost/benefit of peer review has received a great deal of attention since the inception 
of the program. While it is difficult to generalize because of the wide differences in size and pro­
file of practices among member firms, the cost of most peer reviews is generally less than one 
percent of one year’s accounting and auditing fees. This is an expense incurred only once every 
three years. When the benefits of peer review in terms of improved professional competence and 
performance are balanced against cost figures of this sort, the Board questions whether cost is 
the real issue.
One commentator, knowledgeable about the program, recently cited fear of not passing 
peer review as a key impediment to the growth in membership.6 If that is the case, and the Board 
suspects it may be, it should be made clear to nonmember firms that the primary purpose of peer 
review is to help firms improve their performance. Commenting on the value of peer review, the 
SEC Report observes: “ In a sense, peer reviews ‘should pay for themselves’ by reducing 
auditors’ risks of liability to those who rely on their audits.”
5 Hill and Knowlton, Member Services Assessment- Findings and Observations (Confi dential and Proprietary Study Performed for the AICPA, 
September 1982).
6 Clint Romig, “ Peer Review Key to Continuing Professional Standards Says Louisiana CPA,” Public Accounting Report vol. VI, no. 4, 
April 1983.
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Nevertheless, the Board recognizes that cost of peer review may be perceived as 
exceeding its benefits and thus may be a deterrent to membership. The Board continues to sup­
port any reasonable means to reduce the cost of peer review, provided they do not dilute or 
appear to dilute the effectiveness of the process.
Over the course of the past five years, many suggestions have been made to reduce the 
cost of peer review. Some have been implemented, including the elimination of the quality con­
trol review panel and reliance on a firm’s inspection program to reduce the scope of its peer 
review, both of which have been discussed previously. Other cost reduction suggestions have 
been rejected, notably that the three-year peer review cycle be extended and that an alternating 
cycle of full-scope/limited-scope review be adopted. The Board concurs with the section’s rejec­
tion of these two proposals because it believes that they would have decreased, or would have 
been perceived to have decreased, the effectiveness of the process.
Need for a Public Relations Program
During 1982, the division published its first directory of member firms. While this was 
an important first step in public relations, the Board believes that the subject of education and 
public relations merits urgent attention.
As an independent study revealed, both member and nonmember firms believe that the 
public has not been made aware of the importance or meaning of membership in the division.7 
Consequently, nonmember firms experience little, if any, external or internal pressure to 
join.
As Chairman McCloy stated in his address to the Institute’s Council, the Board 
believes that bankers, financial analysts, and businessmen in general are not sufficiently aware 
of the self-regulatory program.8 They do not know what the peer review process is about or what 
it has accomplished. In the past, it seemed premature to advertise a program while it was still 
being developed. Now that both the peer review and special investigative processes are opera­
tional, it seems apparent that the program has reached a stage at which it can be presented with 
pride as an accomplished fact
Efforts to inform users of financial statements and others about this program appear to 
offer many rewards. Not only would such efforts improve the credibility of the profession, but 
they might also increase membership. If public awareness were increased, some firms that now 
are unwilling to incur peer review costs and meet other membership requirements would likely 
find it in their best interests to do so. This in turn would increase the effectiveness of the 
program.
It should also be possible to educate nonmembers and the public about the differences 
between self-regulation and governmental regulation, and point out that self-regulation empha­
sizes preventive and corrective rather than punitive action.
7
Hill and Knowlton, op. c it.
8 See Exhibit I.
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There have been suggestions that the SEC might require disclosure in proxy statements 
regarding whether the registrant’s auditor is a member of the division or is otherwise subject to 
peer review.9 This might be effective in increasing membership, but it is a step away from self­
regulation, since it depends on action by a government agency. Also it would only affect auditors 
of SEC registrants. The Board would prefer to see the profession address its membership problem by 
means other than seeking government action.
Performance of MAS Engagements for SEC Audit Clients
At the request of the executive committee, in May 1978, the Board undertook a major 
study of the “ scope of services” issue. A variety of views were received in comment letters and in 
testimony at a two-day public hearing On the question of whether an auditor who provides 
management advisory services (MAS) to an audit client impairs his ability to render an indepen­
dent opinion on the fairness of that client’s financial statements. In June 1978, the SEC released 
Accounting Series Release no. 250 which required disclosure in proxy statements of all non­
audit services furnished by a registrant’s auditor and of the percentage relationship of such fees 
to audit fees.
The Board reported its findings in June 197910 and recommended, among other things, 
that peer reviewers review MAS engagements performed for audit clients to test for compliance 
with independence standards, and that members annually report to the section selected informa­
tion about fees for MAS and tax services for SEC clients. The executive committee implemen­
ted all of the Board’s recommendations.
When the SEC rescinded ASR no. 250 in January 1982, member firms were required 
to report to the section additional information regarding management advisory services engage­
ments performed for SEC registrants that are also audit clients of the firm. The Board monitors 
the information so reported.
The Board continues to believe that audit committees and boards of directors should 
review and determine what effect the performance of MAS engagements has on the indepen­
dence of their auditors. Section members are required to provide audit committees or boards of 
directors of their SEC clients information concerning MAS services notwithstanding rescission 
of ASR no. 250. Based on its oversight of peer reviews, the Board is satisfied that member firms 
are complying with the requirements. Furthermore, MAS engagements performed for SEC 
registrants are considered by peer reviewers in selection of audit engagements to be reviewed, 
and peer reviewers also ascertain whether the role played by the firm in the performance of MAS 
engagements impairs its independence as an auditor. The Board has seen no evidence to cause it 
to believe that the magnitude or the nature of MAS engagements being performed is impairing 
the independence of member firms.
9 Harold M. Williams, The 1980s: The Future o f  the Accounting Profession, An address before the AICPA Seventh National Conference on Current 
SEC Developments, January 3, 1980, Washington, D.C.
10 Public Oversight Board, Scope o f  Services by CPA Firms, (New York  AICPA, 1979).
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CONCLUSIONS
The division deserves to be commended for its accomplishments in fostering the highest 
quality of auditing and accounting practice by its member firms. Yet, those accomplishments are 
virtually unknown by either the public that benefits most from them or significant segments of 
the profession itself.
The public is not aware that the peer review and special investigative processes 
materially reduce the potential for audit failure. In the opinion of the Board, these two important 
aspects of the program have in fact reduced the number of audit failures by fostering and improv­
ing quality control systems of firms belonging to the division. The Board believes that those who 
doubt the objectivity of the section’s peer review and special investigative processes would be 
favorably impressed if they were made more aware of how these processes operate and what 
they have accomplished. The accounting profession needs to dispel the erroneous assumption 
held by some segments of the public and by some in government that every business failure is 
also an audit failure. An education program should serve to heighten public confidence in the 
accounting profession at a time when business failures have triggered litigation against auditors 
who reported on financial statements of businesses that subsequently failed.
A final note. While the profession can be justly proud of the significant progress it has 
made in the short span of five years, it must guard against a spirit of complacency and a human 
tendency to backslide. As Chairman McCloy stated in his address to the 1983 spring meeting of 
Council of the AICPA:
“The accounting profession’s self-regulatory program has made 
a promising start—indeed a rather spectacular one. I believe the POB 
is justified in placing real confidence in it. Confidence-inspiring fea­
tures lie mainly in the vigor and motivation with which its progress 
has been marked.
But, the program has not yet won laurels on which it can con­
fidently rest or be complacent. There is a need for constant reex­
amination of the program’s objectives and the profession’s dedication 
to their achievement.”
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Address by Public Oversight Board Chairman John J. McCloy to AICPA Council, May 9, 
1983.
Accomplishments of 
the SECPS: the 
POB’S assessment
Over five years have passed since 
the first meeting o f the public 
oversight board (POB), which 
took place in March 1978. The 
POB oversees the SEC practice 
section (SECPS) o f the American 
Institute o f  CPAs division for  
CPA firms. In this adaptation o f  
POB Chairman John J. McCloy’s 
address at the AICPA council 
meeting in Phoenix, Arizona, last 
May, McCloy reports on the 
achievements to date o f the 
SECPS’s self-regulatory pro­
gram and the challenges that lie 
ahead.
The public oversight board (POB) 
was created to do what its name im­
plies—oversee the self-regulatory 
program of the SEC practice section 
(SECPS) of the American Institute 
of CPAs division for CPA firms. It 
was to be composed of five individ­
uals whose backgrounds, experi­
ence and judgment would enable 
them to bring objectivity to the ac­
counting profession’s self-regula­
tory program. The conduct of the 
program is the responsibility of the 
profession itself, but this indepen­
dent board, composed mainly of 
nonaccountants, represents the in­
terests of the public, i.e., the users 
of financial statements, and at the 
same time assists the profession in 
seeking to achieve a constantly im­
proving quality of professional ser­
vices.
First, a few words about the com­
position of the POB. Three of us 
have been members of the board 
since the inception of the program. 
Besides myself, two former chief 
executives of major companies, Ar­
thur M. Wood and John D. Harper, 
have completed five years of ser­
vice. I am a lawyer and former chief 
executive of a bank. Two former 
Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion chairmen, Ray Garrett, Jr., and 
William L. Cary, completed our 
initial five-man bo ard . Ray Garrett 
and Bill Cary made outstanding 
contributions not only in the forma­
tion of the board’s initial policies 
and procedures but also in formulat­
ing practical means for overcoming 
some of its early problems. For ex­
ample, Ray Garrett chaired the two- 
day public hearing the board held on 
the scope of services question and 
was the chief author of the board’s 
report on the subject.1 Unfortunate­
ly, both of these distinguished and 
experienced men have since died. 
They were replaced in 1981 by Rob­
ert K. Mautz, a member of the ac­
counting profession and a recipient 
of the Institute’s gold medal, and in 
1983 by A. A. Sommer, Jr., a law­
yer, a former SEC commissioner 
and a former member of the Insti­
tute’s board of directors. The POB 
is capably assisted by Louis Matu­
siak, who has been our executive 
director since the beginning, and 
three full-time CPA staff members 
as well as a number of part-time re­
tired accountants who assist in mon­
itoring the peer review process.
The board does not have and does 
not wish to exert line responsibility.
Reprinted from the August 1983 issue of the 
Journal of Accountancy.
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The program would not be self-reg­
ulatory if it did. From the beginning 
we have subscribed to the view that 
all authority must be vested in the 
profession. We can oversee, com­
ment, suggest and point out; we 
cannot order or demand.
The board and its staff are active­
ly involved, however, in all aspects 
of the self-regulatory program. We 
try to attend all meetings of every 
committee of the section; we also 
consult on request with the SECPS 
executive commiittee on emerging 
issues, review every peer review of 
a member firm, attend exit confer­
ences held at the conclusion of peer 
reviews, review the work of investi­
gative teams appointed by the sec­
tion’s special investigations com­
mittee (SIC) and periodically confer 
with the commissioners and staff of 
the SEC. On one occasion we testi­
fied before a congressional commit­
tee.
I am pleased to report that the 
SEC supports the section’s pro­
gram. Chairman John S. R. Shad, 
like his predecessor, Harold M. 
Williams, has publicly compliment­
ed the program, and Chief Accoun­
tant A. Clarence Sampson’s con­
structive suggestions have helped 
the section find solutions to some of 
its more difficult problems. In the 
early stages there was apprehension 
in some quarters of the profession 
that the SEC might seek to impose 
itself on the section in a harmful 
way. To the credit of the leadership 
of both the SEC and the section, this 
hasn’t happened. There exists now 
a healthy liaison, in part through 
section officers and Institute staff 
members and in part through the 
POB, that I believe well serves the 
respective interests.
While the POB has oversight re­
sponsibility for only the SECPS, 
members of the board are kept in­
formed of the major developments 
in the private companies practice 
section (PCPS) as well. We under­
stand that the PCPS has objectives, 
requirements and a peer review pro­
cess very similar to those of the 
SECPS. In our view, member firms 
of both sections deserve much cred­
it for their commitment to the im­
provement of the quality of ac­
counting and auditing practice.
Peer review
The foundation of the accounting 
profession’s self-regulatory effort is 
the peer review process. The year
1983 marks the completion of the 
second three-year cycle of peer re­
views in the SECFS—more than 
4(X) member firms have undergone 
peer review. In addition, more than 
1, 100 firms that belong only to the 
PCPS will have been reviewed be­
fore this year is out.
By subjecting their accounting 
and auditing practices to peer re­
view, member firms demonstrate 
their dedication to achieving high- 
quality professional service. The 
board has established a comprehen­
sive program for monitoring peer 
reviews, and this activity consumes 
the lion’s share of the time of our 
staff and a significant amount of at­
tention of board members. As I 
mentioned earlier, board members 
periodically attend peer review exit 
conferences. Having attended sev­
eral of these, I can testify to the 
impression I received as a layman of 
the seriousness and penetration that 
characterized most of those confer­
ences. As board member Mautz put 
it so pungently in his article in the 
May issue of the Journal of Accoun­
tancy: “ Those cynics who see [peer 
review] as an exercise in mutual 
backscratching have no understand­
ing of the effect of peer criticism on 
proud and sensitive professionals in 
a highly competitive activity.’’2 
Even though some of the discus­
sions are heated, I can say that a 
uniform characteristic of the peer 
review process is that the reviewed
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firm accepts and benefits from criti­
cisms and suggestions made by peer 
reviewers.
The primary thrust of the peer re­
view process is to identify weak­
nesses in a firm’s quality control 
system and to insist, when appropri­
ate, that the firm take corrective ac­
tion. Formal sanctions are to be 
considered only in rare cases when 
the firm’s quality control system 
can’t be relied on and the firm re­
fuses to make the corrections 
deemed necessary by the peer re­
view committee.
The SECPS’s peer review com­
mittee has imposed some rather se­
vere additional requirements on 
firms whose quality control systems 
were deemed to be somewhat defi­
cient. Since these requirements 
were voluntarily agreed to by the 
firms, they have not been classified 
as sanctions. Correspondence be­
tween the committee and the re­
viewed firms detailing such addi­
tional requirements are placed in the 
public file. To date, 20 firms— 
roughly 5 percent of the member­
ship—have been required, as a con­
dition of continued membership, to 
undergo an accelerated full-scope 
peer review, i.e., a review in the 
next year or two rather than every 
third year. An additional 15 firms 
have had to agree to a revisit by the 
peer reviewer to ascertain whether 
the firm has taken appropriate cor­
rective action.
There is further evidence, I be­
lieve, that the peer review process is 
working in the public’s and the pro­
fession’s best interests. Occasional­
ly, a peer reviewer will conclude 
that financial statements on which 
the member firm has opined were 
not prepared in all material respects 
in accordance with generally ac­
cepted accounting principles. In ap­
proximately 40 percent of such 
cases, the reviewed firm concurred 
with the judgment of the reviewer
and recalled its report, and correct­
ed financial statements were re­
issued. In the remaining cases, al­
most all of which involved financial 
statements of closely held compa­
nies, the firms were already per­
forming or about to perform the 
subsequent year’s audit and com­
mitted themselves to correct the de­
ficiencies in the course of such au­
dits.
The board believes that the peer 
review process has been well con­
ceived, is being continually modi­
fied and improved with experience 
and now constitutes an efficient and 
key ingredient of the profession’s 
self-regulatory program. Based on 
the POB’S monitoring of the pro­
cess over a period of several years, 
we are confident that fewer non- 
GAAP financial statements are be­
ing issued because of the peer re­
view process.
As I will discuss later, member­
ship in the division is declining. 
One of the most often cited causes 
for attrition in membership in the 
SECPS, and I understand in the 
PCPS as well, is the cost of peer 
review. In response, the SECPS has 
implemented a number of cost-sav­
ing measures, such as the elimina­
tion (at the board’s suggestion) of 
the quality control review panel and 
placing reliance on a firm’s inspec­
tion program to reduce the amount 
of work that peer reviewers person­
ally perform. We believe these 
changes have not diluted the effec­
tiveness of the process. We under­
stand that the PCPS also has taken 
measures to reduce the cost of peer 
review.
This matter of the cost of peer 
review has been much discussed. 
While it is difficult to generalize be­
cause of the wide differences 
among firms, it would appear that 
the cost of most peer reviews is less 
than 1 percent of one year’s ac­
counting and auditing fees, and this
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expense is incurred only once every 
three years. When the benefits of 
peer review in terms of improved 
professional competence and per­
formance are balanced against cost 
figures of this sort, one must won­
der whether the cost of peer review 
is the real issue. I was interested to 
read last month in the Public Ac­
counting Report a statement by 
Clinton J. Romig, a former member 
of the AICPA council and currently 
a member of the peer review com­
mittee of the PCPS, that “ fear [by 
firms] that they do not measure up 
to all of the required standards is the 
greatest deterrent to peer re­
views.’’3 This might be consistent 
with our experience that some firms 
withdraw from the SECPS as their 
time for peer review approaches. If 
Romig is correct, it could mean that 
a number of firms lack an under­
standing of peer review or that their 
quality controls are in fact inad­
equate. Of course, some firms may 
just be unwilling to be bothered 
with peer review irrespective of the 
adequacy of their controls. This 
would mean they are overlooking 
an opportunity for improvement. 
None of these alternatives seems 
very attractive in terms of overall 
quality standards of the profession 
and protection of the public. Per­
haps I am guilty of oversimplifica­
tion, but if there is any merit in 
these observations, the profession 
may wish to consider the need for a 
program of education and persua­
sion in order to improve the perfor­
mance of the profession through the 
broadest possible acceptance of 
peer review.
The recently issued 1982 annual 
report of the SEC is bullish on peer 
review. The report observes that 
“ peer reviews should ‘pay for 
themselves’ by reducing auditors’ 
risks of liability to those who rely 
on their audits.’’4
As you know, the SECPS and the 
SEC have worked out an arrange­
ment under which the SEC inspects 
POB oversight work papers and has 
access on a sampling basis to speci­
fied peer reviewers’ work papers. 
As a result of this review, the SEC 
has indicated its satisfaction with 
the process. In its 1981 report to 
Congress, the SEC stated that the 
“ standards for performing and re­
porting on peer reviews are appro­
priate . . . [and] are being mean­
ingfully applied’’5 and, in its 1982 
report, that it “ can rely to a great 
extent on the POB’s oversight func­
tion in fulfilling its own oversight 
responsibilities.’’6
In summary, the board believes 
that the peer review process has 
been very successful to date. While 
peer review can never be a guaran­
tee against audit failures, we be­
lieve that the process has improved 
the quality of the audits performed 
by members of both sections.
Special investigations committee
One of the first matters considered 
by the POB was what action, if any, 
should be taken by the SECPS with 
respect to alleged or possible audit 
failures involving SEC clients of 
member firms. Because significant 
Situations involving alleged audit 
failures are generally investigated 
by the SEC or result in private liti­
gation, there was a question about 
whether the section should get in­
volved at all. There was also the 
question of whether the section 
should defer any proceeding until 
the conclusion of litigation and gov­
ernmental proceedings so as not to 
prejudice the firm involved. The 
board, keeping public interest in 
mind, recommended that when pro­
ceedings or litigation indicated pos­
sible audit failure, the section 
should ascertain whether such pro­
ceedings or litigation stemmed from 
a deficiency in the quality controls 
of the auditing firm or an insuffi­
ciency in auditing standards, requir­
ing corrective action. The protec­
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tion of the users of financial state­
ments would be the paramount con­
cern. Disciplinary procedures look­
ing toward punishment of the audit­
ing firm were thought to be less 
important; besides, the firm in­
volved would most likely be facing 
actions by governmental and regu­
latory bodies and private litigants.
As a result of lengthy discussions 
between the board and the SECPS 
executive committee, the SIC was 
created by special resolution of the 
executive committee in 1979. At all 
stages in the development of these 
procedures, the balancing of the in­
terests of the profession and the 
public received the most careful at­
tention.
Members of the SECPS are re­
quired to report to the SIC any liti­
gation or proceedings against them 
or members of their firms involving 
SEC registrants. The SIC screens 
and reviews such cases to the extent 
necessary to determine whether an 
investigation is warranted. To date, 
member firms have reported over 
60 cases of litigation or other pro­
ceedings against them involving 
SEC registrants.
The committee has screened and 
closed a number of the reported 
cases. Others are being monitored 
for further developments and four 
investigations have been undertak­
en. To date, no investigation has 
resulted in discovery of a deficiency 
in the investigated firm’s quality 
control system so important that the 
imposition of a sanction was war­
ranted. In three instances, however, 
suggested improvements to the 
firm’s quality control system were 
voluntarily implemented by the in­
vestigated firm. Incidentally, mem­
bers of smaller firms will be inter­
ested to learn that all four 
investigations to date have involved 
larger firms.
The POB and its staff follow 
closely all of the SIC’s activities 
and have full knowledge of all cases
reported. One or more members of 
the board’s staff have attended all 
SIC meetings and a board member 
has also attended most of them. 
Based on this observation, we be­
lieve that the SIC takes seriously its 
responsibilities and is equipped and 
disposed to make reasoned, well- 
founded decisions. It has already 
made some tough ones. Anyone 
who thinks the SIC is designed to 
gloss over the transgressions of fel­
low accountants would, I believe, 
seriously underestimate the quality 
of the process and the dedication of 
the members of the committee and 
of the section’s executive commit­
tee to which it reports.
But the SIC poses a conundrum. 
One of the objectives of the SIC is 
to provide additional assurance to 
the public that member firms are 
complying with professional stan­
dards in the conduct of their SEC 
practices. However, the rules of the 
SECPS require that SIC proceed­
ings be conducted in privacy to all 
but the POB, and this requirement is 
carefully observed by everyone. 
This is tantamount to asking the 
public and the SEC to accept on 
faith that the SIC is doing its job as 
intended or, at best, to take the 
POB’s word for it. On this matter, 
the board doesn’t have a solution 
because we understand and accept 
the need for privacy in proceedings 
of this character.
There is, unfortunately, a public 
expectation that the SIC should 
function in a manner similar to the 
governmental regulatory model. 
The public, including some people 
in government, do not seem to dif­
ferentiate between governmental 
regulation and self-regulation. 
Many believe the SIC—and thus the 
entire self-regulatory program— 
will lack credibility unless sanc­
tions are regularly imposed and 
publicized.
The Mautz article mentioned ear­
lier highlights the sharp differences
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between governmental regulation 
and self-regulation. Governmental 
regulation, the model best known to 
the public, treats audit failure as a 
matter deserving punitive action. 
Self-regulation, appropriately con­
cerned with protecting the public, 
focuses on methods to prevent or 
reduce the possibility of future audit 
failures. The POB wholeheartedly 
endorses self-regulation and be­
lieves that a self-regulatory pro­
gram does not have to emulate the 
governmental regulatory model to 
be effective. In essence, self-regu­
lation is complementary to govern­
mental regulation and deals with 
practical corrective measures which 
government is less well equipped to 
handle.
As I mentioned earlier, our board 
maintains liaison with the SEC on 
various aspects of the SECPS’s ac­
tivities. The nature of our liaison 
with respect to SIC matters is still 
being developed because of the dif­
ficulty of balancing the understan­
dable desires of the section for con­
fidentiality against the SEC staffs 
belief that it should have more in­
formation in order to evaluate this 
aspect of self-regulation. However, 
we hope to persuade the SEC to rely 
to a large degree on the POB’s over­
sight of SIC activities.
For several years there was con­
cern within the SECPS and the POB 
that the procedure for dealing with a 
cause célèbre audit failure was not 
firmly in place and that the self-reg­
ulatory program could suffer a seri­
ous setback if such a case arose and 
was poorly handled. The board be­
lieves this is no longer a serious 
concern. In the POB’s view, the 
SIC program and procedures are 
well conceived, the committee is 
well established and it is performing 
its task diligently and effectively. 
The board believes that the SIC has 
already demonstrated its ability to 
deal with difficult cases with firm­
ness and fairness. At the same time, 
the credibility problems resulting
from the privacy requirement I 
mentioned earlier and the unrealis­
tic expectations on the part of the 
public and some people in govern­
ment are matters of continuing con­
cern.
Membership
The division for firms has a signifi­
cant impact on the quality of audits 
of publicly traded companies. As 
the POB reported in its last annual 
report, over 86 percent of such com­
panies are audited by firms belong­
ing to the division. Even more im­
pressive is the fact that those 
companies account for over 98 per­
cent of the sales volume of all pub­
licly traded companies.
However, analysis of member­
ship data reveals a disturbing trend. 
Membership in the division reached 
an all-time high of 2,200 firms in 
the fall of 1980. Currently, only 
1,700 firms are members—a pre­
cipitous drop of 500 firms. There 
are undoubtedly a variety of reasons 
for this decline, some of which the 
division has little or no control over. 
I have already mentioned concern 
with peer review costs. It seems to 
us, though, that some actions could 
be taken to increase membership. 
While the division has embarked on 
several membership campaigns, lit­
tle has been done to create external 
pressure to encourage nonmembers 
to join.
Public relations
The accounting profession’s self- 
regulatory program is perhaps one 
of its best-kept secrets. Bankers, fi­
nancial analysts, businessmen in 
general and perhaps even the major­
ity of clients know very little about 
this constructive program on which 
the profession has embarked. Yet, I 
don’t know of any article on this 
topic that has appeared in a nonac­
counting publication.
Very few persons outside the pro­
fession are aware of what the peer 
review process is about or what it
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has accomplished. Several years 
have been spent getting the divi­
sion’s program in place and func­
tioning. In the past it may have 
seemed premature to advertise a 
program still being developed. Now 
we believe the program has reached 
the stage at which it can be present­
ed with pride as an accomplished 
fact. Accordingly, we believe the 
subject of education and public rela­
tions merits urgent attention. Ef­
forts to inform users of financial 
statements and nonmembers of the 
division about this progam would 
seem to offer many rewards. Such 
efforts would improve the credibil­
ity of the profession as well as in­
crease the desire of accounting 
firms to participate in the division’s 
program, which in turn would in­
crease the effectiveness of the pro­
gram. If public awareness was in­
creased, perhaps some firms that 
now aren’t willing to spend the time 
and effort to undergo peer review 
and to meet other membership re­
quirements would find it in their 
best interest to do so. Also, it 
should be possible to educate the 
public regarding the emphasis that 
self-regulation places on corrective 
action rather than on punitive ac­
tion.
There have been suggestions that 
the SEC might require some disclo­
sure in proxy statements on whether 
the registrant’s auditor is a member 
of the division or is otherwise sub­
ject to peer review. This might be 
effective in increasing membership, 
but it is a step away from self-regu­
lation, since it depends on action by 
a governmental agency. Also, it 
would affect only auditors of SEC 
registrants. Our board would prefer 
to see the profession address its 
membership problem by means oth­
er than seeking governmental ac­
tion.
Conclusion
I recognize that this has been a rath­
er sketchy summary of the program 
of the SECPS as I view it from the 
vantage point of the POB. The ac­
counting profession can be justly 
proud of its program’s accomplish­
ments to date. I know of no other 
profession’s self-regulatory pro­
gram which can approximate the ac­
counting profession’s in imagina­
tion and scope.
I take considerable comfort from 
the fact that, although the POB is 
primarily composed of nonaccoun­
tants, we now have on the board an 
accountant whose point of view can 
constitute a valuable asset to the 
board as it attempts to help improve 
the profession’s self-regulatory pro­
gram.
As Bob Mautz pointed out in his 
article, there are a number of quite 
falsely entertained expectations 
about what the self-regulatory pro­
gram of the accounting profession 
can or should be able to effect. 
There are quite enough reasonable 
expectations which the program can 
properly be called on to fulfill with­
out compelling it to respond to a 
number of unjustified ones. No 
firm’s quality control system is go­
ing to be perfect and audit failures, 
though hopefully diminished, will 
still occur. But this is no cause for 
unjust criticism or, much less, de­
spair.
The accounting profession’s self- 
regulatory program has made a 
promising start—indeed, a rather 
spectacular one. I believe we are 
justified in placing real confidence 
in i t  Confidence-inspiring features 
lie mainly in the vigor and motiva­
tion with which its progress has 
been marked.
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But the program has not yet won 
laurels on which it can confidently 
rest or be complacent. There is a 
need for constant reexamination of 
the program’s objectives and the 
profession’s dedication to their 
achievement. ■
1Public Oversight Board Report: Scope of 
Services by CPA Firms (New York: AICPA, 
1979).
2Robert K. Mautz, “ Self-Regulation—Per­
ils and Problems,” JofA, May83, p.82. 
3Clinton J. Romig, ‘‘Peer Review Key to 
Continuing Professional Standards Says 
Louisiana CPA,” Public Accounting Re­
port, April 1983, p . 16.
4Securities and Exchange Commission, An­
nual Report 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1982), p . 16.
5SEC Annual Report 1981 (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1981), p.28.
6SEC, Annual Report 1982. p . 16.
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COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
Member
John J. McCloy 
Chairman
Arthur M. Wood 
Vice Chairman
John D. Harper
Robert K. Mautz
A. A. Sommer, Jr.
Term Expires 
December 31
1983
1985
1985
1984
1984
Affiliation
Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & 
McCloy, New York
Former chairman and chief executive 
officer of Sears, Roebuck & Co,
Former chairman of Communications 
Satellite Corporation and former chair­
man and chief executive officer of 
Aluminum Company of America
Director of Paton Accounting Center and 
Professor of Accounting, University of 
Michigan
Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and 
former SEC commissioner
Richard A. Stark Legal Counsel 
to the Board
Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & 
McCloy, New York
Permanent Staff
Louis W. Matusiak 
Charles J. Evers 
David P, Boxer 
Alan H. Feldman 
Marcia E. Brown 
Miriam Freilich
Executive Director and Secretary 
Technical Director 
Assistant Technical Director 
Assistant Technical Director 
Administrative Assistant 
Secretary
Supplemental Staff
Sidney M. Braudy 
John W. Hawekotte 
John W. Nicholson
Retired partner of Main Lafrentz & Co. 
Retired partner of Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Retired partner of Arthur Young
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Regular fees of Board members
Reimbursement of expenses to Board members and 
their firms
Salaries of staff, including part-time reviewers
Personnel
Occupancy
Staff travel and related expenses 
Printing and paper 
Legal expenses*
General office expenses 
Total expenses
$173,500
16,700
402,700
58,200
81,600
23,000 
12,300
68,000 
29,600
$865,600
* Paid to Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
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Excerp t from 1982 SEC Report to Congress on Oversight of the Accounting Profession.
Accounting Matters
Oversight o f the Accounting Profession—The Commission has historically 
monitored, relied on and encouraged initiatives in the standard-setting processes 
of the private sector, subject to Commission oversight, through frequent staff 
contact with the private sector standard-setting organizations, attendance at or 
participation in meetings, public hearings, and task forces, and review and com­
ment during the standard setting process. Moreover, this contact speeds refer­
ral of emerging problems found in company filings to the right private group 
for resolution. Although the Commission will continue to seek to fulfill its 
statutory responsibility by close oversight of private sector initiatives, it will not 
hesitate to take appropriate regulatory action when necessary.
SEC Practice Section and Peer Review—As of June 30, 1982, 428 accoun­
ting firms had voluntarily become members of the Division for CPA Firms of 
the American institute of Certified Public Accountants and particularly its SEC 
Practice Section (SECPS); these firms audit over 90% of all publicly held com­
panies. Firms that are members of the SECPS are subject to certain re­
quirements designed to improve the quality of their audit and accounting prac­
tice. Among these are the filing of an annual report, the maintenance of a system 
of quality control, and the testing of that system once every three years through 
an independent peer review process.
An independent Public Oversight Board (POB) oversees and annually reports 
on the SECPS. In Its report dated June 30, 1982, the POB concluded that “the 
self-regulatory structure is sound and is functioning properly." 36Based on its 
oversight of the 400 peer reviews which had been conducted, the POB con­
cluded that “there is now considerable evidence that the peer review program 
is functioning as intended and that section members are taking actions need­
ed to improve the quality of their practice.” 37
Although peer reviews provide no assurance that ail audit failures will be 
identified or avoided in the future, any audit failures that occur should be due 
to isolated breakdowns or “people problems,” and not to inherent deficiencies 
In firms’ system of quality control. In a sense, peer reviews should “pay for 
themselves” by reducing auditors’ risks of liability to those who rely on their 
audits.
(1) Access Agreement—Under the terms of an “access” arrangement agreed 
to by the SECPS and the Commission, for the first time the Commission’s staff 
reviewed a sample of the working papers underlying reviews. Based on this 
review and the staff's review of the POB’s oversight files, the Commission has 
determined that It can rely to a great extent on the POB’s oversight function 
in fulfilling its own oversight responsibilities. Nevertheless, the Commission will 
continue to monitor the peer review process by reviewing certain working papers
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pursuant to the access arrangement so that it can periodically evaluate this im­
portant self-regulatory initiative and the need for refinements in the process 
as a result of changing professional, economic and regulatory conditions.
(2) Sanctions—The true test of any voluntary self-regulatory organization is 
whether it appropriately sanctions members that do not meet its standards. 
There are two aspects to the SECP's disciplinary procedures. First, the SECPS 
may impose sanctions as a result of serious quality control deficiencies un­
covered during peer reviews. While the SECPS has not imposed any “formal” 
sanctions to date, some peer reviewed firms have voluntarily agreed to take 
and report prompt appropriate corrective action. The Commission concurs with 
the POB’s belief that this informal process gives the SECPS the ability to act 
promptly and achieves the same result as the imposition of a sanction. The 
formal sanction process remains available and should be used when satisfac­
tory corrective measures are not undertaken promptly or where a member firm 
chooses not to cooperate.38
Pursuant to the second aspect of the SECP's disciplinary procedures, member 
firms are required to report to the Special Investigations Committee (SIC) litiga­
tion against them or their personnel and proceedings or investigations public­
ly announced by a regulatory agency that involve clients or former clients which 
are or were registrants and that allege deficiencies in the conduct of an audit 
or in reporting thereon in connection with any required filing under the Federal 
securities laws. The SIC considers whether these allegations indicate the need 
for corrective measures by such firms, changes in professorial standards, and/or 
appropriate disciplinary measures. The POB believes that the SIC made signifi­
cant progress during the past year and that, although the structure for impos­
ing sanctions has not yet been tested, the SECPS will appropriately discipline 
member firms. 39The Commission thus far has no basis for reaching any con­
clusion and believes that visible evidence as to specific SIC activity is critical 
to demonstrate to the public the effectiveness of this aspect of the professions 
self-regulation.
The Commission continues to believe that all accounting firms which audit 
public companies should join the SECPS. During the past year, a number of 
changes were made to SECPS membership requirements which the SECPS 
believes will significantly reduce the costs of membership while maintaining 
an effective self-regulatory program. The principal change was the elimination 
of the requirement that a quality control review panel (QCRP) be appointed 
for peer reviews conducted by firms or administered by associations of firms. 
The Commission does not object to the SECP’s determination to eliminate the 
QCRP. The Commission supports other initiatives designed to facilitate member­
ship in the SECPS provided that they do not detract from the credibility of 
the self-regulatory program.
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SELF-REGULATION- 
PERILS AND PROBLEMS
Changing unrealistic 
expectations about 
the self-regulatory 
process is a major 
task of the SECPS.
by Robert K. Mautz
Embarking on a program of self-regulation is 
anything but risk-free. An important and per­
haps unrecognized risk is the danger that ex­
pectations about the program may not be met 
and that this could encourage unwise actions. 
Unfulfilled expectations may result from in­
adequate performance of the self-regulatory 
process or from unrealistic expectations. The 
profession's experience, to date, suggests that 
unrealistic expectations may be the greater 
danger.
Unrealistic expectations arise because crit­
ics of the self-regulatory process—and even 
some participants—fail to recognize that
□  Self-regulation is unavoidably limited in 
scope, operating within the constraints im­
posed by an already existing and rigorous dis­
ciplinary system.
□  Any regulatory activity, and self-regula­
tion in particular, requires a difficult balanc­
ing of private rights and public good.
□  Self-regulation differs from public regula­
tion in motivation, method and purpose.
The Scope of Regulation
If one considers regulation in the broadest 
sense, the complexity of the total process is 
overwhelming. It includes, on the one hand,
Author's note: Initially presented as my views in a talk pre­
pared for the American Institute of CPAs tenth national con­
ference on current SEC developments, this adaptation has 
since been reviewed by the public oversight board (POB) of 
the SEC practice section of the AICPA division for CPA firms 
and generally expresses the board's sentiments. The POB 
oversees the self-regulatory efforts of the SEC practice sec­
tion. The conference was held in Washington, D.C., last Janu­
ary 11 and 12.
Reprinted from the May 1983 issue of the 
Journal of Accountancy.
such considerations as the maintenance of an 
economic and legal environment conducive to 
the continued provision of professional ser­
vices for those who desire them and, on the 
other hand, sufficient control of conditions so 
that competition in the provision of those ser­
vices does not fail and a monopoly does not 
emerge to exploit society’s needs. It involves 
acceptance of the fact that the contracting for 
and the performance of services will from 
time to time result in misunderstandings or 
disagreements about the cost or quality of the 
services performed. When this occurs, a sys­
tem for adjudicating such disputes is needed, 
a system that is recognized as both authorita­
tive and equitable to all parties.
When members of the public are unable to 
evaluate the quality of a service because of its 
technical nature, a licensing provision requir­
ing practitioners to meet established qualifica­
tions, perhaps including examination, may be 
appropriate. In addition, standards of perfor­
mance must be established together with some 
means of reviewing that performance to pro­
tect the lay public from substandard practice. 
Finally, on those relatively rare occasions 
when performance deviates so far from the 
norm that sanctions are in order, the authority 
to impose and enforce sanctions becomes a 
part of the regulatory process.
Given a fresh start and no limitations, one 
might invent a program of self-regulation that 
includes all the activities described. To do so 
might be interesting, but it would not be a 
very useful activity. Society has indicated no 
desire to free accounting, or any other profes­
sion, from all of the regulatory mechanisms 
now in place. Agencies with far greater pow-
R O B E R T K. MAUTZ, CPA, Ph.D., is a member of the public 
oversight board of the SEC practice section of the American 
Institute of CPAs division for CPA firms and is director of the 
Paton Accounting Center at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor. A member of the Accounting Hall of Fame, Dr. Mautz 
is a past president of the American Accounting Association 
and a former editor of the Accounting Review; he also has 
served on the AICPA council and board of directors. In 1980 
he was awarded the Gold Medal, the Institute's highest honor.
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ers than any possessed by the accounting pro­
fession police competition in the economy. 
An existing system of courts settles civil dis­
putes. Licensing powers are reserved for the 
states. A multiplicity of federal and local po­
licing organizations are constantly on the alert 
for criminal activity. The Securities and Ex­
change Commission has been assigned regu­
latory responsibilities that it shows no sign of 
relinquishing, and it couldn’t relinquish these 
responsibilities even if it would.
Viewed realistically, self-regulation is but 
one element in a complex system of controls. 
Society entrusts to a self-regulating profession 
a limited set of privileges, among them the 
right and responsibility to develop, establish, 
review and refine standards of professional 
performance. Society does so at least partly 
because it believes the technical expertise and 
situational understanding of members of the 
profession qualify them to perform that role 
effectively. There is no reason, nor has ac­
counting the ability, to challenge the other 
participants in the total regulatory structure. If 
accountants perform their role satisfactorily, 
the tasks of the others will all be eased. Ac­
countants have a small niche in the total regu­
latory process but an important one.
Private Rights and 
Public Responsibility
Establishing and maintaining appropriate 
standards of professional performance de­
mand a proper balance of private rights and 
public responsibility. In a perceptive article 
entitled “The Professions Under Siege’’ Jac­
ques Barzun takes note of the diminishing sta­
tus of the professions, including accounting, 
the unavoidable conflict of interest between 
members of a profession and the lay public 
that uses its services, the vulnerability of the 
professions to public displeasure and the real 
dangers of public regulation.1
Professionals ask for special privileges, in­
cluding the exclusion from practice of those 
who don’t qualify. In return for privileges, 
society demands superior performance, high 
ethical behavior and very rare failures. Absent 
society’s satisfaction, the profession’s privi­
leges are endangered.
1Jacques Barzun, "T he Professions Under Siege,”  Harper's, 
October 1978, pp.61-68.
Balancing private rights and public respon­
sibilities is a difficult matter indeed, one 
Barzun contends is well beyond the 
scope of codes and policing. In 
his view, what is needed 
is a moral regeneration 
“ which can come 
about only when the 
members of a 
group feel
once more confident that ethical behavior is 
desirable, widely practiced, approved, and 
admired.’’2 To establish and maintain such a 
condition should be part of the goal of self­
regulation.
But how are such high-sounding goals to be 
achieved in the practical, down-to-earth, 
highly competitive world of accounting? Ac­
complishment is neither easy nor impossible, 
but the problems involved are gaining increas­
ing attention in the profession where the spot­
light has been focused on the American Insti­
tute of CPAs division for CPA firms, which 
includes the SEC practice section (SECPS) 
and the section’s public oversight board 
(POB).
Public Regulation and 
Self-Regulation
However similar their goals, public regulation 
and self-regulation have important differ­
ences, not all of which are immediately appar­
ent. Public regulation is conducted with the 
full power of the state in support of estab­
lished requirements. Self-regulation has no 
equivalent authority. At most, it can exclude 
noncomplying members from whatever bene­
fits group membership confers or impose 
whatever sanctions members have voluntarily 
agreed to accept. Such powers as the ability to 
subpoena records and witnesses are not avail­
able in self-regulation.
Public regulation is likely to emphasize 
punishment for transgressions; self-regulation
2Ibid., p.68.
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will more likely emphasize remedies and the 
avoidance of future deficiencies. There are 
reasons for this. Public regulation is common­
ly employed only when the community has 
become aroused by what it considers improp­
er conduct. The public wants that conduct 
stopped and finds punishment a useful deter­
rent. Self-regulation, however, often has a 
strong concern for equity to members of the 
group, which must somehow be balanced 
with service to the community. Members of 
the group and the community are both served 
more effectively by remedy than by punish­
ment.
Self-regulatory processes accept the need 
for punishment in egregious cases, but sanc­
tions are likely to have a positive purpose—to 
be aimed at improved service to society along 
with equitable treatment of the regulated. 
Public regulation tends to view infractions as 
willful violations deserving punishment. Self­
regulation is concerned with establishing stan­
dards for proper conduct and eliminating the 
causes of unintentional and perhaps unrecog­
nized failings as well as the rare refusal to 
meet professional standards.
Finally, public regulation offers opportuni­
ties not available to those engaged in self­
regulation. Many a successful political career 
has been founded on the publicity and acclaim 
accorded a vigorous and resourceful prosecu­
tor. Protecting the public, putting the rascals 
away and battling the wrongdoers earns rec­
ognition, gratitude and higher public office. 
There is no equivalent opportunity or reward 
in self-regulation.
Self-regulation, if it is justified at all, must 
rest on something more than the self-interest 
of those regulated. Generally, self-regulation 
is perceived as more equitable than public reg­
ulation because the standards to be met are 
established and enforced by fellow practition­
ers whose experience provides an understand­
ing of the environment, the risks, the pres­
sures and the possibilities of service that 
laymen neither comprehend nor understand. 
Self-regulation, if performed properly, also 
assures better service to the public because its 
emphasis is on remedy and improvement and 
because it is in closer touch with practice, 
more aware of changing needs, and more re­
sponsive to the wants of those who use the 
service than any other form of regulation can 
be.
Self-Regulation’s Challenge
With this as backgound, let’s consider the 
problems faced in the establishment and 
maintenance of any system of self-regulation. 
A major task of those involved in the process 
is one of establishing mutual trust. Many 
members of the regulated group accept self­
regulation with considerable reservation, and 
then they accept it only because they consider 
it less undesirable than the public alternatives. 
Few people seek regulation for its own sake. 
Professionals seem to find any regulation par­
ticularly irksome, a slight to their profession­
alism and a potential threat should it get out of 
control.
Those who represent the public and have its 
best interests at heart are concerned that en­
trusting regulation to members of the profes­
sion is risky at best. They fear that self-inter­
est and pressure from colleagues will 
discourage the establishment and mainte­
nance of adequate standards. In addition, 
within the profession there will always be 
some who disagree with the self-regulatory 
process, no matter how it is conducted, and 
either refuse to cooperate or vigorously op­
pose what the majority of the group has ac­
cepted. These disparate views must somehow 
be brought together sufficiently to permit the 
program to function.
Another difficulty is found in reforming the 
erroneous expectations entertained by some 
who confuse self-regulation with public regu­
lation. Those who have the point of view of 
public regulation expect a visibly impressive 
level of activity. They want unequivocal evi­
dence that the process is working effectively. 
Without that evidence, they contend the pro­
cess lacks credibility. In their minds, public 
regulation is the model, and unless self-regu­
lation emulates that model it isn’t as effective 
as they believe it should be. When their ex­
pectations aren’t met, they become critics of 
the self-regulatory process.
At the other extreme are the expectations of 
the group subject to self-regulation. Within 
that group will be some—often too many— 
who really expect no change from their pre­
viously unregulated condition. They deny any 
need for regulation and, at least in their own 
minds, contest the right of anyone, even their 
professional colleagues, to impose require­
ments on them. Others will accept regulation
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but only in those few cases in which there is 
great public interest that demands action if the 
profession is to avoid severe censure. To 
them, self-regulation means minimum inter­
ference with the status quo. Obviously, the 
expectations of all these interests cannot be 
met.
Finally, and because of these disparate 
views, there is the very real problem of main­
taining satisfactory relationships between 
those engaged in self-regulation and those 
who have been entrusted with an oversight 
responsibility and would likely be charged 
with public regulation should the self-regula-
“The SEC, charged by Congress with 
an oversight responsibility, interacts 
with the section's self-regulatory 
effort in a number of ways.”
tory process not succeed. If the latter do not 
perform their oversight responsibility, they 
fail their own assignments. If they perform 
that oversight with excessive zeal, self-regu­
lation is co-opted and becomes public regula­
tion.
completion of the investigation, a recommen­
dation of sanctions, if considered necessary, 
will be made to the section’s executive com­
mittee.
The SEC, charged by Congress with an 
oversight responsibility, interacts with the 
section’s self-regulatory effort in a number of 
ways. It discharges its assigned responsibility 
in part by becoming familiar with and testing 
the work of the peer review committee, which 
constitutes the cornerstone of the self-regula­
tory program. It also seeks assurance that the 
SIC is performing satisfactorily and that the 
POB’s oversight function is effective. To 
date, there has been no action on the part of 
the SEC that can be construed as a serious 
threat to the “ self’’ designation of the sec­
tion’s regulatory process. At the same time, I 
must report no lack of interest or failure of 
diligence in the performance of the SEC’s 
oversight function.
The POB’s Role
The POB, four of whose five members aren’t 
accountants, occupies an interesting position 
in the total scheme, a position with multiple 
responsibilities. It represents the public, 
meeting with various elements of the seif-reg­
ulatory program on a recurring basis to remind 
them of the public interest and the public 
viewpoint.
The POB has no line authority and desires 
none. From the beginning, it has taken the 
position that, if the process is to be one of self­
regulation, all authority must be vested in 
members of the section. The POB can over­
see, comment, suggest and point out; it cannot 
order or demand. The POB sees as its purpose 
the protection of the section’s right to self­
regulation. It can achieve that purpose most 
effectively by reminding the SECPS execu­
tive committee of how its decisions may be 
viewed by the public. Here’s an example.
There is an understandable tendency on the 
part of member firms to object to any sugges­
tion that technical membership rules be disre­
garded. They are quite within their legal rights 
in doing so. Some rules were specifically in­
tended to limit the scope of members’ respon­
sibility, for example, a cut-off date before
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Progress of the SECPS
Where is the profession now, insofar as the 
self-regulatory program for the SECPS is con­
cerned? In a relatively short period of time, 
the section has made remarkable strides. It has 
adopted an impressive set of quality control 
standards and other requirements to be met by 
all members. A program of peer reviews has 
been established, reviewers have been 
trained, reporting mechanisms have been de­
veloped and a procedure by the peer review 
committee to evaluate the performance of 
completed peer reviews is in place and func­
tioning. (This applies to the private compa­
nies practice section (PCPS) as well, although 
the PCPS is beyond the scope of this article.)
Recognizing that peer reviews, like audits, 
must be performed on a sampling basis, a 
special investigations committee (SIC) has 
been added to the SECPS to inquire into al­
leged audit failures charged by plaintiffs in 
litigation against any member firm. Such in­
quiries are designed to be no more burden­
some on the member firm than necessary, but 
if circumstances suggest that there may be a 
need for important remedial measures investi­
gation of part or even all of the subject firm’s 
practice is likely to follow. In addition, at the
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which the SIC wouldn’t be concerned with 
cases in litigation. The POB recognizes this 
but on at least one occasion recommended a 
contrary point of view. Relying on technical 
rules, however legal, to avoid inquiries into 
alleged audit failures may be regarded by the 
public as contrary to the spirit of self-regula­
tion. If there has been an audit failure, the 
section needs to know what it is, assess its 
implications for future service and assure that 
any necessary remedial action is taken.
Furthermore, the public is unlikely to favor 
technicalities that appear to protect substan­
dard practice at the expense of investors. The
". .  peer review is effective 
in improving the general quality of audits 
performed by firms subject to it."
public isn’t likely to be mollified with the 
statement, “Technically, the case can’t be in­
quired into.’’ It asks, “Do the facts in any 
way imply that current standards of audit per­
formance are not being met?’’ and “Are the 
rules intended to protect the public or to aid 
firms in evading standards?’’ The POB serves 
the cause of self-regulation by pointing out the 
reasoning the public will apply.
The FOB staff serves as a reviewer of peer 
review workpapers and the peer review pro­
cess in general. The FOB also serves as a 
buffer and provides liaison between the SEC 
and the section’s regulatory activities. In do­
ing so, it must be able to understand and em­
pathize with both but sympathize with nei­
ther. On some matters the views of these two 
parties are remarkably similar; on other mat­
ters they differ widely. The FOB strives to 
explain each to the other and to seek a work­
ing reconciliation wherever possible.
How Good Is Peer Review?
Two questions have been asked often enough 
that they deserve comment:
1 Is peer review working?
2 As long as the profession has peer review, 
why does it need the SIC?
The two are closely linked. The first ques­
tion is raised most frequently on the basis of 
reports of litigation in the financial press al­
leging accounting or audit failures. Why do 
these occur if peer review is effective?
There is no question in my mind that peer 
review is effective in improving the general 
quality of audits performed by firms subject to 
it. The FOB receives and reads copies of all 
adverse and qualified opinions resulting from 
peer reviews; we sit in on some exit confer­
ences; our staff reports to the board on letters 
of comment to the managements of reviewed 
firms and on such managements’ responses to 
those comments. We observe in the peer re­
view process an effectual and efficient combi­
nation of professional challenges and re­
sponse, both in the performance of the review 
and in the reaction to it. Those cynics who see 
it as an exercise in mutual backscratching 
have no understanding of the effect of peer 
criticism on proud and sensitive professionals 
in a highly competitive activity.
If peer review is working so well, why is 
there so much litigation? The peer review pro­
cess is systems oriented. It is directed at the 
reviewed firm’s system of quality control. 
Litigation concerns specific cases. No system 
can assure that work performed by mortals 
will always be completely free of fault. Given 
the total number of audits required and the 
variety of conditions, distractions, pressures 
and personal problems faced by the auditors 
involved, some mistakes, lapses of judgment, 
oversights and misunderstandings are as in­
evitable as death and taxes. Perfect audits in 
all circumstances and situations are as unlike­
ly as sustained perfection in any other human 
activity.
Poes the Profession Need an SIC?
Allegations of audit failure sufficient to initi­
ate litigation against accountants may imply a 
weakness in a firm’s system of quality con­
trol. The fact that they may imply such a 
weakness requires attention. The SIC is 
charged with the responsibility of ascertaining 
the probability of substance in such charges. 
A preliminary review is made of the allega­
tions and the financial statements in question 
to discover whether the charges have any ap­
parent foundation in fact. In some instances, 
this is enough to establish that they are 
groundless and the case can be closed. In oth­
er cases, the preliminary review finds enough 
in the allegations to warrant a discussion with 
the firm’s representatives and a review of re­
cent peer review findings. In some instances, 
the circumstances are such that the SIC must
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conclude that there is a possibility that a fail­
ure in the firm’s system of quality control 
occurred and that it could happen again.
If so, an investigation is undertaken. The 
purpose of the investigation is to protect the 
public, not to try the case. The specific case is 
already in litigation; the court will determine 
the validity of the plaintiff's allegations. But 
the court will go no further. It is incumbent on 
the self-regulatory process to protect the pub­
lic against quality control breakdowns. If, and 
I emphasize the word if, the firm’s quality 
control process has failed in a specific case, 
the process may also have failed in other au­
dits involving clients in the same industry or 
performed by the same personnel. A credible 
self-regulatory program must ascertain whether 
this is the fact and, if it is, take steps to see that 
the deficiency in the firm’s system is remedied.
When the implications of an alleged audit 
failure are deemed sufficient to threaten the 
public interest, the SIC investigates the firm’s 
system of quality control in terms much more 
specific than contemplated in recurring peer 
review. Peer review remains the cornerstone 
of the section’s self-regulatory process. Yet, 
no matter how effective peer review is, there 
will always be instances of alleged audit fail­
ure, and all of these raise questions about the 
firm’s quality controls. The SECPS needs the 
SIC to ascertain whether the potential for 
harm to the public exists and to demand reme­
dial measures, if needed.
A Learning Experience
For all concerned, this is a learning experi­
ence, an interesting, exciting and difficult ex­
perience. Many of the things are being done 
for the first time, not only by those doing them 
but the first time for the profession. Unavoid­
ably that means there will be some unhappy 
people. No one wants to be investigated or 
sanctioned. Neither does anyone in the pro­
cess want to make the mistake of charging 
dereliction of duty without adequate support 
for the charge.
An interesting question has been raised 
about the type of people who should be ap­
pointed to the POB and to the SIC. Let me 
describe the current members of these units as 
I have come to know them through direct ob­
servation. All have carried important execu­
tive responsibilities; they are seasoned by 
long experience. They possess excellent per­
sonal reputations for integrity, dependability 
and diligence, reputations that they are un­
willing to see sullied in any way. They are 
prudent, courageous, understanding and in­
tent on getting the facts. They have high stan­
dards of professional and public responsibil­
ity, are aware of the pressures and temptations 
that beset mortal man and on occasion exhibit 
a strong sense of moral outrage. None of them 
is seeking to build a new reputation; their am­
bitions have been fulfilled. They can be trust­
ed to take their public responsibilities serious­
ly and to discharge them objectively.
At the AICPA’s ninth national conference 
on current SEC developments in 1982, mem­
bers of the POB were criticized as not being 
" movers and shakers.” I expect that this is a 
fair description of their present activities,
“Those who are now engaged in any way 
within th e . . . self-regulatory process 
are seriously endeavoring to improve 
the quality of professional 
practice without placing undue 
burdens on anyone."
however vigorous their earlier careers may 
have been. I do not view such a description as 
pejorative in any sense, although it may have 
been so intended. My experience with movers 
and shakers is that they often leave a mess for 
someone else to clean up. Intent on fame and 
glory, they stride through life straightening 
out the affairs of lesser men whether dr not 
such attention is needed. It is a good thing that 
some movers and shakers are part of the ac­
counting profession. It is also a good thing 
that they aren’t members of the POB or the 
SIC. One quakes at the mere thought of what a 
first-class mover and shaker could do in such a 
position.
Some Future Prospects
So I would offer some suggestions. To those 
who criticize an apparent lack of exciting ac­
tions, I note that they may continue to be 
disappointed. The self-regulatory process 
works most effectively when it is not in the 
public press. Don’t expect it to emulate public 
regulation; it should and does favor different 
methods and different goals. It will always 
favor investigations and sanctions directed at
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the improvement of audit service over those 
directed at mere punishment.
To those who object to the current self- 
regulatory process as too onerous, one can 
only assert that self-regulation is, in fact, reg­
ulation. Society expects more and more each 
year from those who have the good fortune to 
be regarded and rewarded as professionals. 
Those who are now engaged in any way with­
in the accounting profession’s sel- regulatory 
process are seriously endeavoring to improve 
the quality of professional practice without 
placing undue burdens on anyone. They ap­
preciate, enjoy and take pride in the quality of 
their real world practice. Those who fail to 
meet satisfactory standards in their profes­
sional work will not be permitted to give the 
entire SECPS a bad reputation or to expose the 
self-regulatory process to undesirable risk.
I can also offer some assurances. Recon­
ciliation of opposing influences within the
section, and between the section and govern­
ment, is no easy matter. Yet, it is progressing. 
Peer review and special investigations are 
proceeding. Liaison with the SEC is effective. 
The POB adds an essential public point of 
view, does not hesitate to make its views 
known and has been effective in causing re­
consideration of decisions. Much has been 
done and there is much yet to do. All engaged 
in this effort are entitled to take some pride in 
current accomplishments as long as they do 
not rest on that record. The real record of self­
regulation for accounting is yet to be made as 
the profession works its way through this peri­
od of economic stress and strain. The hard 
decisions are yet to come. ■
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SEC PRACTICE SECTION
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Representative Firm Affiliation
Ray J. Groves, Chairman 
George L. Bernstein 
T. Frank Booth 
Robert M. Coffman 
J. Michael Cook 
Mario J. Formichella 
Howard Groveman 
William D. Hall 
Charles Kaiser, Jr. 
William B. Keast 
Charles E. Keller, III 
Bernard Z. Lee 
J. Curt Mingle 
J. David Moxley 
Richard W. Paddock 
Donald R. Sloan 
John A. Thompson 
Jack C. Wahlig 
Michael A. Walker 
John W. Zick 
Donald P. Zima
*Ernst Whinney 
*Laventhol & Horwath 
A. M. Pullen & Company 
*Fox & Company 
*Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
*Arthur Young
*Alexander Grant & Company 
*Arthur Andersen & Co.
Pannell Kerr Forster 
*Coopers & Lybrand 
Keller, Zanger & Company 
*Seidman & Seidman 
Clifton Gunderson & Co. 
*Touche Ross & Co.
Battelle & Battelle 
*Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
*Main Hurdman
*McGladrey, Hendrickson & Co. 
Mann Judd Landau 
*Price Waterhouse 
May Zima & Co.
* Firm entitled to permanent seat because firm audits 30 or more registrants under Section 12 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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PEER REVIEW COMMITTEE
Member Firm  Affiliation
Joseph X. Loftus, Chairman 
John F. Barna 
Clark C. Burritt 
Paul B. Clark, Jr.
Robert W. Egner 
Arthur I. Farber 
Marvin Feller 
Robert E. Fleming 
John G. F. Knight 
Daniel J. Moylan 
Edward J. O’Grady 
Joseph A. Puglisi 
Robert H. Temkin 
Frank H. Whitehand 
Jerry E. Whitehorn
Price Waterhouse
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
A. M. Pullen & Company 
Main Hurdman 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Altschuler, Melvoin & Glasser 
Ernst & Whinney 
Fleming, Tempas & Co.
Purvis, Gray and Company 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
Laventhol & Horwath 
Touche Ross & Co.
Arthur Young 
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Whitehorn, Bradsher & Tankersley
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE
Member Firm Affiliation
Robert A. Mellin, Chairman 
Mark J. Ferngold 
*Edwin P. Fisher 
*Thomas B. Hogan 
Harry L. Laing 
*Leroy Layton 
*John B. O’Hara 
*Leon P. Otkiss 
*David Wentworth
Hood and Strong 
Laventhol & Horwath 
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
A. M. Pullen & Company 
Main Hurdman 
Price Waterhouse 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Co.
Retired
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